distinct perspectives can be discerned. The first level includes the Perspectives (note the capital "P") of Experience, Logic, Transcendental (or Critical) philosophy and Metaphysics. The second level includes the theoretical, the practical and the judicial standpoints (corresponding, respectively, to Kant's three Critiques). And the third level includes the empirical, logical, transcendental and hypothetical perspectives. 4 Perovich's comments all focus on the issue of the relation between the three standpoints in Kant's System, so I will limit my present comments in the same way, even though the full profundity of Kant's religious philosophy cannot be appreciated without seeing in it the role of the other two levels of perspectives as well.
Perovich's biggest mistake is to assume that a perspectival interpretation implies that
Kant was recommending an attitude of "openness and flexibility" which would be "accommodating" to a wide variety of perspectives which might come to a person's mind, so that "religious phenomena" would "admit of multiple interpretations" (p.97). My view, on the contrary, is that, to call these "perspectives" does not mean they are arranged arbitrarily, or related in such a way that one is just as good as another, or can be replaced by another at will.
Rather, Kant sees them as having a definite, "architectonic" order, determined by reason itself. is always the same, whether he is examining beauty, religion, natural organisms or any other deep human experience. His answer is that the practical standpoint always has "primacy" over the theoretical. 6 In other words, the value of any human experience of meaning comes from its participation in practical reason, since the limits of theoretical reason exclude the possibility of grasping transcendent reality from the latter standpoint.
An important point to note here is that Kant's doctrine of the primacy of practical reason does not imply that the practical has primacy over the judicial as well as the theoretical standpoint. Rather, it means only that, whenever we compare the practical standpoint with the theoretical-such as we must when we wish to trace our judicial experiences back to some deeper, rational source-the practical is the standpoint which must be given the primary place in our interpretation of experience. That Kant actually regarded the judicial standpoint as having primacy over both the theoretical and the practical is evident in many respects, not the least of which is the fact that the name he chose for the three main books in his philosophical system, "Critique", is itself an explicitly judicial term. 7 Unfortunately, perhaps because of the chronological order of Kant's three Critiques, scholars have had an almost irresistible temptation to see Kant's God through the spectacles of his notion that God is, for theoretical reason, no more than an idea. What so often goes unnoticed is that Kant wrote his three Critiques in the Moreover, the term "open-minded" here does not mean that Kant succumbed to the alltoo-common view that "whatever you believe is true is true for you"; rather, it means that he recognized his own inability to condemn, from the theoretical standpoint as such, anyone who chooses to interpret their religious experiences in terms of a given set of theoretical dogmas.
What he did feel free to condemn was the tendency of many religious people to emphasize a certain theoretical interpretation of their experience more than its practical implications for their moral life. So this whole issue has little, if anything, to do with Kant's recognition of the fact that the human mind is not capable of "intellectual intuition" (whereby an object is created in the very process of thinking it), as Perovich seems to think it does (pp.97-98,102). Rather, it has to do with what Kant does and does not claim to be able to deny to religious believers (who normally do not make the mistake of believing they can take God's place as Creator).
As an example of Kant's supposedly exclusive (reductionist) emphasis on the practical standpoint in interpreting religion, Perovich refers to prayer. He claims that "what Palmquist understands by prayer" is "stated wishes directed toward God" (p.97). Frankly, I am puzzled to read this, since it does not in fact represent my understanding of prayer, and since I never committed myself on this issue in the article in question. Since I hope to examine thoroughly at a later date the true depth of Kant's philosophy of prayer as an inner disposition of devotedness to obeying the Law God puts in our hearts, I will not defend my interpretation of Kant on this point in any detail here. Instead, I will merely comment that Kant never so much as hints that prayer is "only" or "nothing more than" the expression of such wishes (p.97, Perovich's emphasis). These words, as is so often the habit of Kant's commentators, have been added by Perovich and attached to quotations in order to make Kant look like a reductionist. But no such language will be found in Kant's own writings, for he was no reductionist. 11 Instead, the alert reader will always find a cautious form of expression which is based, more than anything else, on a Critical Critical way of thinking), the belief that Kant's hidden agenda is to do away with all theoretical theology will fall like scales from our mind's eye. Kant has nothing of the sort in mind. Rather, his intention is to provide the practical ground for a proper way of thinking about God from a theoretical standpoint, by (1) denying that we can know about God from the theoretical standpoint, and (2) affirming that this standpoint, when directed towards the supersensible, can nevertheless be used to obtain hypotheses for rational belief, the value of which can then be confirmed or denied by practical reason. This interplay of denial and affirmation is the source of the "openness" and "balance" which Perovich proclaims "are quite simply not there" in Kant's position (p.98).
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This means it is quite wrong to say that Kant believes "that numerous Christian doctrines are intelligible from the practical standpoint and from none other" (p.103, note 9), even though Perovich believes Kant is "transparent" in his support of such a position. What is the case is that Kant consistently and openly argues that, when comparing the theoretical and practical standpoints for their relative importance, we must always put the practical before the theoretical, as its ground, rather than vice versa. Hence, although it is incorrect to say that for Kant "[t] he moral perspective [= standpoint] provides the only legitimate context for interpreting" Christian doctrines (p.98), it would be correct to say this standpoint must be the rational ground for any such interpretation. The difference between true religion and false religion is not that one is practical and the other theoretical, but that one allows the practical to govern the theoretical, while the other requires the theoretical to govern the practical. Thus, in discussing the role of theoretical, "statutory laws" in religion, Kant does not categorically deny their validity, but requires that the "priority" be given to practical, moral laws:
So much depends, when we wish to unite two good things, upon the order in which they are united! True enlightenment lies in this very distinction; therein the service of God becomes first and foremost a free and hence a moral service.
14 This emphasis on the proper order in our combination of the practical and theoretical standpoints means that, for Kant, there is always a space left open for theoretical beliefs-beliefs which can never be fully justified by practical reason, but are acceptable because of their ability to strengthen our reliance on the latter (see above, note 13).
Kant's "Critical theology", therefore, operates in precisely the way suggested by Perovich's "revision" of Kant's position: "The Kantian need not abandon his commitment to practical foundations of religion, but he must supplement them if he would also be a Christian" (p.101). I believe Kant himself supported exactly the same position in his own explanation of a healthy form of religious belief. 15 By using our religious experience and our practical reason as the two "known" points on the map of religion, we can, as it were, "triangulate" in order to find appropriate ways of thinking about the God who forever remains beyond the grasp of our theoretical knowledge. If my interpretation is correct, then Perovich and Kant are in agreement that "triangulating" God is the best advice to offer to a philosophically-minded Christian. This requires us to see religion not merely as a set of theoretical dogmas to think about, nor merely as a set of practical rules to act upon, but as a set of experiences which show us the way to be. This does not mean that religious thoughts and actions are rendered superfluous: on the contrary, they are only in this way seen in their proper perspective. For only after we have rooted ourselves in such experiences (i.e., those which many philosophers, unlike Kant, have not been afraid to call "mystical" (see above, note 10)) can we then interpret these through the doctrine of the primacy of practical reason, and in so doing, use them to triangulate our way to an adequate theoretical (though hypothetical) understanding of the God within us.
pretation of Kant's position. But we must not forget that Kant not only believed in practical knowledge, but regarded it more highly than its theoretical counterpart (something which some Christian philosophers and theologians unfortunately seem reluctant to do). Perovich underestimates just how much of Christian doctrine can be justified from the practical standpoint.
13 Perovich claims that "nothing beyond what our commitment to morality necessitates" is justified by the practical standpoint (p.99). In his Religion, however, Kant's actual position is that we are not required to think or act in any way other than that which our practical standpoint necessitates, but that we are justified in extending religion beyond morality as long as the nonmoral (hence, non-necessary) elements serve to encourage the development of our moral 
